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ABSTRACT
The transformation of American banking from the parochialism of 1960
to the internationally linked structure of the 1980s is analyzed and
detailed quantitatively. While the liberalization of trade and the
existence of and changes in financial regulations profoundly affected the
pace and order of this transformation, it is argued that international
banking is the historic norm.International banking on the one hand
provides the opportunity to banks to diversify their portfolio, butmay
simultaneously expose them to increased systematic risk, especially with
regards to movements in the U.S. real interest rate. Deposit insurance
provides an incentive for banks to take on such priced systematic risk
with welfare costs which must be balanced against the welfare gains from
the insurance. The paper closes with an exploration of the nature of the
linkage of major movements in real interest rates and exchange rates.
Further research seems warranted on monetary-policy-regime changes and
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The American banking industry has suffered major losses in the 1980s
related to foreign, agricultural, and petroleum—industry loans. This paper is
concerned primarily with the former losses although agricultural distress is
certainly related to the exchange rate movements which have been so damaging
to foreign borrowers. Three related topics are examined with respect to the
nature of foreign losses: (a) the institutional transformation which made
the major U.S. banks a part of an international banking system and, at the
same time, exposed to potentially major foreign losses; (b) the nature of
the banks foreign risk ——inparticular, the macroeconomic factors which can
be related to the systematic, nondiversifiable portion of that risk; and
Cc) possible fundamental explanations of the movements in these basic
macroeconomic factors. I believe that this triad offers a framework for
understanding why foreign loan losses now are an unprecedented problem for
U.S. Banks.2
In 1960Americanbanks' international operations were largely limited to
financing international trade. During the 1960s and early 1970s American
banks began to go offshore in large numbers primarily to avoid certain banking
regulations, taxes, and capital controls. Subsequent to the breakdown of the
Bretton Woods system, general relaxation of capital controls initiated a new
era of international banking.
In a broader context, American banks may be viewed as taking a leading
role in the reinternationalization of banking since, for the century before
the onset of World War I, European and especially English banks played an
important part in the operation of a world capital market.' Government
controls on international capital flows and sometimes on convertibility
reduced the role of international banking during the era 1914_l960.2 Thus on
a longer term view, international banking can be seen as the norm, rather than
an unprecedented development.
Expanded international banking can be understood as concomitant to growth
in international trade and capital flows. Exchanging moneys and financing
goods in transit was once the essence of international banking, but other
activities have become increasingly important: bank lending to foreign firms
and governments provides a more flexible and possibly safer channel for
international capital flows than securities sales;3 foreign deposit taking
activities have in some cases represented an attempt to broaden the scope of
comparative advantage in provision of consumer financial services;4 interna-
tional banks are the dominant players in integrated international financial
markets including the Eurocurrency, Eurobond and foreign—exchange markets;
international banks provide services such as funds positioning and transfer to
multinational corporations; and international banking has been an avenue for
the entrance of American banks into investment banking.3
Economists might want to explain international banking in terms of
facilitating the flow of capital from high—saving to low—saving countries and
of exercising comparative advantage in provision of banking services. Neither
of these explanations seem to help much in explaining why American banks from
a low—saving country would play a leading role in international lending nor in
why foreign banks have entered the American banking market with great success.
I believe that other important forces in the internalization of American bank-
ing include the special strengths of particular banks, advantages of
international diversification, and avoidance or exploitation of regulatory and
tax provisions. Of course, much of today's international banking ——like
international trade —couldnot exist without modern communications.
The paper is organized into three main sections: the first provides
historical background and a survey of the current extent of internationali-
zation of American banking. The second considers the risks of international
lending within the broader context of the banking institution's portfolio.
The third section considers factors affecting the American real interest rate
and its influence on foreign capital markets. Conclusions are drawn in a
final section.
I. TheInternationalizationof the American Banking System
In1960, it was fair to characterize the American banking system as
essentially local in character. American banks were limited, depending on the
state in which they operated, to one office, one city, or at most one state.
A bank's assets and liabilities were largely limited to the immediate
geographical region of the bank. Local banking markets were linked through
national trading in government and other debt securities, a system of corres—
pondent relationships, an emerging interbank Federal Funds market, and large
national corporations which would maintain banking relationships in different4
communities in which they operated.5
The banking industry could be characterized as consisting of two groups:
large banks which desired deregulation so that they could exercise their
expertise over a broader range of geography and services and small banks which
enjoyed the quiet life made possible by local monopolies and oligopolies.
Since 1960 the balance of power has very definitely shifted away from the
numerous smaller banks. It is beyond the scope of the current paper to
develop the reasons for that shift, but two factors must be mentioned: Keeley
(1985) demonstrates that the policies of James Saxon as Comptroller of the
Currency (appointed 1961) effectively resulted in elimination of the monopoly
value of a bank charter which had existed since the Banking Act of 1935.
Rising inflation and hence interest rates in the 1960s and 1970s made many
banking restrictions and regulations so at variance with economic reality that
their elimination was accepted by even smaller banks.
The internationalization of banking in the last 25 years is part of this
general struggle of large American banks to break their parochial fetters.
The international arena frequently provided the cutting edge to this process
as legal constraints were generally weaker there. Internationalization of
American banking has to date primarily affected the wholesale market ——loans
to large corporations and governments, securities, and large deposits ——but
one must note the trend toward greater international and domestic competition
in the consumer market and the so—called middle market of small and medium
sized firms.
For present purposes, it is useful to discuss first the internationali-
zation of American banking firms and then consider entry of foreign firms into
the American banking market.5
L.A. Internationalizationof American BankingFirms
International banking activities of American banks are primarily
conducted through branches, Edge Act Corporations, and foreign subsidiaries.6
Branches (and agencies which have restricted or no deposit—taking authority)
are legally part of the parent bank. Edge Act Corporations permit banks
expanded powers in international banking and operation for those purposes in
states other than their home. Foreign subsidiaries provide U.S. banks an
indigenous presence in foreign countries and may engage in activities
prohibited to the U.S. bank.
The onset of American banks' foreign thrust can be attributed to
avoidance of U.S. regulations. Particularly important in the 1960s were
frequently binding deposit interest ceilings, reserve requirements, and
various capital controls and restrictions.7.. Foreign expansion of American
banks and the Eurodollar market which it fostered have survived the passing of
all these factors, but they were nonetheless important as motivations to incur
the considerable start—up costs in undertaking a foreign expansion.
Although the Federal Reserve System has gathered substantial amounts of
of Information on foreign activities of American banks ——andAmerican
activities of foreign banks ——since1980, there are no consistent data series
going back to 1960 to indicate the changes that have occurred over the last 25
years. However, the changes in scale are so vast that the available estimates
and partial data reported in Table 1 are sufficient to indicate the sweeping
nature of the change that has taken place in American banks' foreign
involvement.
These data on foreign branches indicate that by about 1980 the major
American banks had their overseas operations in place. The decline in branch
assets relative to total assets indicated for 1984 in row 5 reflects a number6
of factors, some of which probably affects the recorded data more than
reality. Perhaps the most important factor is the authorization of Interna-
tional Banking Facilities (IBF's) in December 1981. An IBF allows U.S. banks
to directly participate in the Eurocurrency market; previously this could be
accomplished only through foreign branches or subsidiaries. As a result the
parent hank now maydirectlybook non—U.S. resident business which might
previously have been done through an offshore branch, usually aCaribbean
shell.8 Had the $95.6 billion of U.S. owned IBFs' total assets at theend of
1984 been all reflected instead on the books of Caribbean branches, the branch
assets would have been 24.2% of total assets.
Other factors that may have slowed growth in total assets of foreign
branches since 1980 include: (1) The strength of the dollar in 1984 relative
to 1980 reduced the reported dollar value of assets denominated in foreign
currencies by an amount somewhere between $25 to $40 billion. (2) Capital
adequacy guidelines that became binding in 1982 have reportedly induced some
banks to reduce the denominator total assets by cutting back on relatively low
profit areas such as the interbank Eurodollar market as well as encouraged
off—balance sheet risks such as Note Issuance Facilities.9 (3) International
earnings have been less spectacular in the last five years than previously,'0
and this is believed to have weakened interest in foreign expansion. All of
these factors notwithstanding, however, the data in rows 6—9 of Table 1
suggest continued growth in international penetration by Aniericari banks.
I.E. Foreign Firas in the American Banking Market
The internationalization of American banking has beenvery much a two—way
street as foreign banks also have increased their presence in the American
market since 1960 and at an accelerating pace in recentyears. They have used
the same devices as American banks: branches (and agencies),subsidiary banks7
and nonbariks, and (since 1978) Edge Act corporations.Prior to the
International Banking Act of 1978, foreign banks helda number of competitive
advantages in the U.S. market in comparison to domestic banks. In
particular,
they were exempt from reserve requirements on deposits, permitted to branch
across state boundaries, and underwrite and sell equities in the United
States. In response to the growing presence of foreign banks, theInterna-
tional Banking Act of 1978 removed the exemption from reserverequirements for
branches of large foreign banks and required foreign banks to designatea
"home state" with branching beyond that state limited.'' ThisAct established
...a policy of national treatment in order to promote competitive
equality between domestic and foreign banking institutions in the
United States. The policy of national treatment attempts to give
foreign enterprises operating in a host country the samepowers,
and to subject them to the same obligations, as their domestic
counterparts.
2
Despite the limitations imposed by the 1978 law ——or,actually, its
removal of previously existing advantages ——foreignoperations in America have
continued to grow as indicated in Tables 2 and 3. The Federal ReserveSystem
did not begin collecting data on foreign banks until November 1972,13but a
small amount of foreign banking was estimated to exist in 1966.14By the end of
1984, foreign—controlled banks were very significant factors in the overall U.S.
banking market.15
Several studies have analyzed the factors which seem important in
determining foreign bank entry into the American market. Goldberg and
Saunders (1981) found that key determinants include the differential between
U.S. andEurodollarinterest rates, the price/earnings ratios for American
banks, and the size of net foreign direct investment. The first of these fac-
tors reflects the relative costs of borrowing dollars in the U.S. and abroad.
The second reflects the price of entry through purchase ofan existing U.S.
bank. The third factor appears to reflect the value ofa client base of firms8
based in the same country as the foreign bank and operating in the United
States.16 Ball and Tschoegl (1982) examined data for existing foreign bank
operations in both California and Japan and found in each case that the
decision to enlarge those operations was conditioned primarily by the extent
of the foreign bank's experience in California or Japan, respectively, and by
the existence of other foreign operations by the bank. Walker (1983)
demonstrates that growth of foreign bank offices in recent years has been
greatest outside of the states of New York and California.
Where foreign banks have acquired existing U.S. banks, the acquired banks
have typically been characterized by low profitability if not actual danger of
failure. In many cases, foreign banks are effectively favored in acquiring
such banks in comparison to domestic banks due to the interaction of antitrust
laws with restrictions on interstate branching.'7 Houpt (1983) finds that
once these banks are under foreign control, they behave very much like U.S.
owned banks. However, it may take time to restore the subsidiary banks to
normal levels of profitability, particularly when a large bank is acquired.
Since Houpt notes that acquisition was increasingly preferred to de novo
establishment of foreign—controlled U.S. banks, even troubled institutions
apparently provided a more attractive entree into the U.S. market than
building an entirely new operation.
Taken as a whole, the empirical evidence on foreign entry into American
banking indicates that foreign banks enter to fund their dollar denominated
assets more cheaply, to extend their operations by purchasing attractively
priced banks, and to continue to service existing clients opening up their own
operations in the United States. Although branches, agencies, and Edge Act
corporations typically concentrate on the wholesale business, subsidiary banks
operate very much like U.S. owned banks with profitable consumer and middle—9
market banking activities. Banking skills seem to be useful wherever in the
world they are put to use.
I.C. SuaaryonInternationalization of the Anerican Banking Industry
The last quarter of a century has seen the transformation of the American
banking industry from a primarily locally owned and operating business to one
in which the major firms deal internationally and compete with foreign owned
firms. It is true, of course, that the vast majority of small banks are
nearly as parochial as ever. However, now essentially all major banks have
become part of an international banking system as opposed to the handful that
could be so characterized in 1960. This transformation exposes the banking
system to international risks that have not been experienced since the
interwar period.
II. International Banking Risk
A prime concern in America is whether or not the international activities
of American banks have made them more prone to failure. An extreme version of
this concern is the claim that the large banks have made the U.S. government
via the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (F.D.l.C.) a guarantor of loans
by OPEC nations to developing countries.'8 Bankers sometimes reply to this
charge that geographic diversification should decrease, not increase risk.
In this section, 1 propose a framework for thinking about overall bank
risk and the contribution of international activities to that risk. I believe
that the best way to assess bank risk is in terms of the bank's marked—to—
market equity. This concept envisions valuing all assets, liabilities, and
off—balance—sheet positions of a bank at their current market value. I do not
want to suggest that the F.D.I.C. will move in or depositors flee whenever this
market—equity value turns negative since much of the information is private to10
the bank, but this value does indicate the implications of current conditions
and information for future revenues and costs. Unlike the value of the bank's
stock, market—equity value can be negative because it then measures the
expected loss to the F.D.I.C. if the private information were Instead public.
Changes in market—equity value occur either because the banker makes a
transaction for which the market values of the items bought and sold are
unequal or because of subsequent changes in market conditions.
The first kind of change very much Involves what is termed the business
of banking. If, for example, Citicorp Is correct that it has a special cost
advantage in providing consumer banking services, it can increase its market
equity value by acquiring a consumer bank. In this case the expected net
present value to Citibank of the consumer loans Is greater and consumer
deposits less in comparison to the price paid. If, on the other hand, a bank
does a poor job of assessing credit risks, the loans it makes will be worth
less than the liabilities with which they are funded.
Thus, the market—equity value and its growth over time will reflect the
business skills of the bankers. The expected growth in this value Is
implicitly associated with expected retained earnings while deviations from
this expected growth reflect unusually good or bad fortune. A poor banker
needs no bad luck in order to go broke, but we should separate a banker's
acumen from the risk his bank bears.
The simplest example of risk Is interest—rate risk. Because banks
generally loan for longer maturity than they borrow from depositors and
others, their assets will generally fall in value by more than their liabili-
ties when interest rates rise. Unless the banker has taken offsetting
positions in the financial futures markets, for example, the bank's market—
equity value will fall when interest rates rise or rise when Interest rates11.
fall.'9Since society as a whole cannot diversify away interest—rate risk,
banks ——orwhoever lends long and borrows short ——willbe compensated by an
expected positive return to bearing this risk.
This indicates a general classification of risks as diversifiable or
nondiversifiable or, in an alternative terminology, as idiosyncratic or
systematic. Because the diversifiable or idiosyncratic risk elements In the
returns of a particular claim have no effect on the average return of a well—
diversified portfolio of claims, those risk elements will not be priced or
compensated in terms of expected returns In effcent fInancIal markets.2°
The arbitrage pricing model (APM) suggests that there may be a small number of
factors which have pervasive that is, nondiversifiable or systematic ——
effectson returns generally and that the responsiveness of returns to these
common factors will be priced or reflected in the expected return to the
claim.
Bankers have argued quite successfully that expanding beyond their
traditional geographic boundaries has enabled them to achieve more diversified
portfolios.2' This reduces the overall variability in their market—equity
value by averaging idiosyncratic elements at no cost in expected return. This
argument is much harder to support with respect to international
diversification.
II.A. Systeatlc Risk in International flanking
Let me propose five potentially priced pervasive factors affecting
returns in the world capital market generally and American banking portfolios
in particular:
1. the business cycle
2. inflation
3. the real interest rate12
4.thedollar exchange rate
5. the price of oil.
Because of its size, American developments apparently would dominate the
development of these five factors insofar as they have pervasive nondiversi—
fiable effects on returns.22
Since neither the business cycle nor inflation is instantaneously and
perfectly transmitted between the United States and other countries,23 inter-
national diversification of loans should on this account reduce both the risk
and the expected return on banks. Why does this occur? Firms are more likely
to fail or otherwise default on loans when they are suffering through a
recession or when the inflation rate turns out to be low relative to the f ore—
cast implicit in the agreed upon interest rate. Since both developments will
occur with somewhat different timing abroad than in the United States, American
banks would seem to be able to achieve less bunching of defaults through
international diversification. This reduction in risk of the overall portfolio
would be reflected in a compensating lower average rate of return as well.
However, this pleasant story leaves out potential increases in risk
because returns on foreign lending may be much more sensitive than those on
domestic loans to movements in the real interest rate, the dollar exchange
rate, and the price of oil.24 These other factors appear to have resulted in
a net increase in both risk and expected return due to the internationaliza-
tion of American banking.
A specific example will help to illustrate the principle. Suppose that
banks have lent to firms and governments in a number of developing countries.
Normally such countries are characterized by real growth rates higher than the
real interest rate on these loans. This was especially true in the 1970s when
ex post real interest rates were negligible. Such countries can each year13
borrow enough to pay their interest payments and finance additional investment
without increasing their debt burden relative to income.25 An increase in the
real interest rate will result in dramatic increases in the interest burden of
these developing countries and a general fall in the market value of loans to
them. Thus, diversification across countries does not help when real interest
rates rise. Indeed, developing countries as a group are predictably more
sensitive to this sort of change than domestic borrowers.
We shall see in Section lIt below that increases in U.S. real interest
rates were assocIated with appreciatIons of the U.S. dollar in the 1980s whIle
increases in the U.S. real interest rate were associated with depreciations of
the dollar in the l970s. Shapiro (1985) points out that denominating bank
loans to developing countries in dollars does not really avoid exchange rate
risk but merely converts it to credit risk for private borrowers or country
risk in the case of governments. Thus high (low) U.S. real interest rates not
only directly increase (decrease) developing countries' debt problems but this
effect is reinforced by the influence on the ability to repay dollar—
denominated loans. Nicholas Hope of The World Bank in Boyes et al. (1986)
notes that no country is likely to let its business sector be bankrupt through
no fault of the borrowers, so that private loans become nationalized de jure
or de facto and the risk is primarily not whether or not, but when, the
principal will be repaid and with what interest.26 Boessarts (1985) begins
the analysis of pricing the risk that these loans are least likely to be
repaid when the real interest rate is high and most likely to be repaid when
the real interest rate is low.
American banks' foreign lending may also increase the risk associated
with exchange—rate and oil—price changes unrelated to real—interest—rate
changes, but there the case is less clear cut since these changes may affect14
foreign and domestic borrowers in opposite directions. I know of no research
dealing explicitly with these issues, but note that Chen, Roll, and Ross
(1985) did not find evidence that these last two factors produced priced
(systematic) risk in their U.S. data.
II.B. The Banker's Teiiptation
Deposit insurance should tempt American bankers to undertake too much
systematic risk. The argument is that the more the systematic risk, the
greater the expected returns, and the depositors are not (sufficiently)
concerned about the possibility of a negative market—equity value because the
F.D.I.C. will hold them harmless.27
The implicit subsidy and incentive to risk taking increase as a bank's
capital—to—deposit ratio decreases.28 The 'heads I win, tails you [the
F.D.I.C.] lose" problem becomes quite severe when market—equity value is
significantly negative, since only very risky loans have the potential of
providing a positive value to the shareholders of the bank.29 Crouhy and
Galai (1984) have argued that the monetary authorities should coordinate
capital—to—deposit requirements with the deposit insurance premium rate to
avoid inappropriate taxes on or subsidies to banking through deposit
insurance.
If we view bank regulation and examination as aimed at preventing the
banks from taking excessive systematic risk, it is arguable that the F.D.I.C.
failed in this task because its officers were not aware of the systematic risk
that banks were taking in investing in a number of less developed countries.30
Of course, bankers too may have been unaware of the systematic risk that was
to be undertaken so that the risk was insufficiently priced. Whether bankers
were tempted or mistaken remains an issue for future research. We can presume
that both bankers and regulators now take account of the tendency for15
international loan "defaults" to be positively correlated across countriesso
that international diversification may be limited in value as a tool for
reducing overall portfolio risk.
lit. The Anierican Real Interest Rate and Foreign Capital Markets
I have argued that the major banks have taken on systematic risk through
their international lending activities. In particular, these credits are
likely to experience difficulties when a rise in real interest rates and the
real value of the dollar drastically increases the debt burden of developing
countries. Such a rise indeed occurred in the early 1980s and had its
predictable (at least with hindsight) effects. A complete analysis of the
international risk of the American banking industry would explain the macro-
economic sources of those changes. I believe that no definitive statement is
possible yet, but instead offer some critical and speculative remarks on
possible explanations of this experience.
The U.S federal budget deficit is widely supposed to be the cause of many
——ifnot all ——evils,including high U.S. real interest rates, an overvalued
U.S. dollar, a large U.S. international trade deficit, and high real interest
rates in other countries. The internationalization of American banking and
finance is thought to have offset the increased independence of foreign
interest rates for countries which have floating exchange rates with the
dollar. These statements have been repeated so many times that it would seem
that they must be true.
Unfortunately, the empirical evidence is far from overwhelming at each
step in the argument; hence, the story as a whole may be surprisingly weak.
In this section we first examine the evidence on the linkage of high U.S. real
interest rates since 1981 to the U.S. federal budget deficit and then consider
alternative explanations for high U.S. real interest rates. Next we consider16
the relationship among the value of the U.S. dollar, the U.S. trade deficit,
and U.S. capital flows. Finally, we consider the evidence on the impact of
internationalization of banking and finance on linkages among national real
interest rates.
[u.k. The Federal Budget Deficit and U.S. Real Interest Rates
Standard Keynesian analysis suggests that increases in government
spending or reductions In taxes result in higher real interest rates. Changes
in government spending directly compete with private investment so that higher
real Interest rates are required to choke off otherwIse profItable Investment
projects.3' Reductions in taxes ——orincreases in transfer payments ——are
supposed to cause increases in consumer spending which have the same effects
as increases in government spending.
The recent large federal budget deficits are associated not with
increased government expenditures (relative to G.N.P.) but with decreased
taxes net of transfer payments, where transfer payments include, in parti-
cular, interest payments on the national debt. In marked contrast to spending
Increases, empirical evidence suggests that reductions in net taxes do not
increase real interest rates.32
This means that when the government finances lower net taxes by higher
borrowing, we do not see pressure on investment spending. This result would
require that domestic saving plus capital inf lows go up by the amount of the
increase in borrowing.If this scenario is a correct reading of the evidence,
it means that the standard argument must be wrong at least so far as it
relates higher U.S. real interest rates to the U.S. budget deficit. What
might explain this startling result?17
Measuring the Deficit
One set of explanations turns on problems in the way that the deficit is
measured in the U.S. National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA). There are
three substantial, adjustments to the NIPL federal deficit that must he consid-
ered: (1) correction for inclusion of an inflation component in government
interest payments, (2) adjustment for cyclical factors, and (3) offset of
the large state and local government budget surplus. Table A illustrates that
these adjustments drastically alter the magniture of the economically relevant
government deficit from somewhat more than 4 percent of GNP to less than 1
percent of GNP.33
The correction for inflation arises because NIPA includes as a transfer
payment the portion of nominal interest payments required to maintain the
real value of the public's debt holdings. Rational savers should recognize
income only to the extent that their principal and accrued Interest increases
in real value over the year.34
To separate the effects of government spending and tax laws from those
due to other factors, it is customary to concentrate on the structural
deficit. This requires substracting the estimated $48 billion increase In
expenditures less net taxes associated with above—normal unemployment in
1985.
Taken together, these two adjustments amount to about $97 billion,
leaving an inflation—adjusted structural federal deficit of about $100 billion
——stillsubstantial but only 2 1/2 instead of 5 percent of GNP.
An alternative way to view these figures is to note that subtracting the
cyclical adjustment alone leaves a structural federal deficit of about $149
billion. This is little more than the amount of federal interest payments.
So taxes are at approximately the level required to pay for federalexpenditures and transfer payments other than interest when unemployment is at
normal levels. Structural borrowing is due almost solely to interest pay-
ments. While real federal interest payments (at 4 to 5% per annum) are
unusually large in 1985, it is clearly awkward to say that high real interest
rates are due to the high structural deficit due to the high real interest
rates.
Even without adjusting the state and local government NIPA surplus for
the inflation component of net interest expense and for a cyclical component,
we have an offset to the federal figure of some $58 billion. The remaining
deficit is only 1 percent of GNP while the ideal figure might well indicate a
small surplus.36
The ancient Greeks had a philosophy that a man must work his best to
receive the rewards that gods have fated for him. This analysis suggests that
despite all of President Reagan's efforts to reduce federal spending and
taxes, there has been very little real impact on the overall government
deficit.37 Thus, it may well be that there have been no real government
borrowing shocks to affect the U.S. real interest rate.
Ultrarationality
Even if the deficit had been increased substantially in inflation—
adjusted structural terms, there is a school of thought that argues that
rational consiuners will save their tax cuts in the form of more government
bonds. They therefore will not increase their spending as required for real
interest rates to rise in the standard argument set out at the opening of
Section lii. The basic ideas are that increased spending would imply future
decreases in consumption, and that substitution by the government of bonds for
paid tax receipts does not change optimal consumption patterns over time.
This viewpoint is certainly controversial but it is not without substantial19
empiricalsupport. It is included for the sake of completeness to indicate
that the link between recent U.S. federal deficits and real interest rates is
indeed speculative.38
An Alternative Explanation
I believe, therefor; that there is little empirical evidence to support
either of the two standard contentions, that the U.S. budget deficit is
unprecedentedly large and that this deficit decreased private saving available
to support U.S. investment. Figure 1 nonetheless indicates quite clearly that
the real U.S. interest rate has increased substantially since 1981. What
else can explain this sharp increase?
First let us consider exactly what the figure is saying. The line
labeled i or nominal rate is the average yield on 1—year U.S. Treasury bills
plotted for the second and fourth quarter of each year.4° The line labeled r
or tax—exempt real rate is the nominal rate minus expected inflation over the
next year as measured by a semiannual survey of economists. The line labeled
r* or after—tax real rate subtracts from the tax—exempt real rate the product
of the nominal rate and t, the marginal tax rate.4' These relationships are
summarized in Table 5.
Let us start with the after—tax real rate. This is the concept which is
of most interest to a private U.S. investor, since it measures the increase in
purchasing power which such an Investor expects to gain. We see three
distinct eras for this measure: 1960—1970, 1971—1980, 1981—1985.Compared
to the first period, the middle period averages over 2 percentage points lower
while the recent period averages about 1 percentage points higher. We shall
see shortly that this behavior may be explicable without reference to U.S.
federal budget deficits.20
To move from this after—tax real rate to the nominal rate actually
observed in the financial markets, we must add the three components detailed
at the bottom of Figure 1: the tax due on the after—tax real rate, the
expected inflation rate (Fisher effect), and the tax on the inflation rate
(Darby effect).42 About 2 percentage points of the increase in the tax—exempt
real rate (the more commonly used measure) in 1981—1985 relative to 1960—1970
Is attributable to the tax on the expected—inflation component. This tax is
shifted from borrower to lender under U.S. tax law.
I believe that the remaining 1 percentage point rise in the after—tax
real rate in 1981—1985 compared to 1960—1970 is well within the margin for
measurement error.43 The real problem is to understand why the after—tax real
rate ias so low during 197 1—1980.1 can offer no definitive solution to this
problem but suggest as a working hypothesis that shifts in the investment—
demand function are the most plausible explanation of major sustained move-
ments in the real interest rate. This reflects my reading of the evidence
that investment is very responsive in the long run to differences between the
after—tax real yield on capital and its cost of finance.
The first possibility suggested by this working hypothesis is that the
low after—tax real rate during 1971—80 reflected the slow incorporation of the
accelerating inflationary trend into the investing public's consciousness.
Fisher (1930) argued that this is characteristic of the effect of inflation on
nominal and real rates, although It conflicts with modern notions of efficient
markets.44 Nonetheless, it is riot necessarily irrational to put a positive
probability on an event ——here,a return to low inflation rates ——even
though It does not occur for a number of years In a row.45 In 1980, when
Inflation finally passed 13 percent, this expectation of return to normalcy
may well have become dominated by fears that inflation was getting completely21
out of hand.It should be noted that economists who believe that the
(properly measured) post—1980 after—tax real rate is high compared to the pre—
1971 experience can relate this to slow adjustment of expectations in a
disinflationary environment.
Another, possibly complementary explanation relates the low after—tax
real rate to the political malaise and antibusiness public opinion which
characterized the United States between the dawning awareness of the
Vietnamese disaster and the price controls of 1971 up until the election of
Ronald Reagan th the fall of 1980. That is, even if the real cost of funds
was nil or slightly negative, firms might be deterred from making investments
the value of which might be destroyed by some new regulation or tax. When it
became apparent that Ronald Reagan would be elected in reflection of what the
press characterized as the public's rejection of the failed liberal activism,
America again became a good place to invest.
In these ways, the behavior of the after—tax real rate may be explained
not so much by (possibly illusory) movements in the federal deficit as by
problems in measuring the Investing public's inflation expectations, by the
political climate which can encourage or deter real investment, or by both.
We shall see in Section 111.6 that the behavior of the international value of
the U.S. dollar is rather similar to that of the after—tax real rate and may
reflect similar factors.
[11.8. The U.S. RealExchange Rateand Trade Deficit
The real exchange rate is the product of the nominal exchange rate
(domestic currency/foreign currency) and the ratio of the foreign to domestic
price level. It measures the amount of domestic goods it takes to buy a
standard basket of foreign goods; so a decline in the real exchange rate means
a real appreciation of the domestic currency. An enormous amount has been22
written concerning the appreciation of the trade—weighted U.S. real exchange
rate by some 40 to 50 percent between summer 1980 and winter 1985 and the
sharp depreciation since February 1985.
It is generally forgotten, however, that the U.S. real exchange rate
depreciated by about 30 to 40 percent during and especially immediately
following the breakdown of the Bretton Woods System in 1971—1973.Lothian
(1985) has demonstrated that the behavior of the U.S. real exchange rate is
best described as stable under the Bretton Woods system, shifting up
(depreciating) by about 30% in 1973, relatively stable again through 1980,
shifting back down by about 30% in 1980—1982 and relatively stable since then
except for the 1984—85 bubble.46 Figure 2 illustrates the behavior of the
value of the dollar since the last days of the Bretton Woods System. This
behavior Is broadly similar to that of the after—tax real interest rate ——
particularlyso If the Smithsonian Agreement and massive interventions under
it are viewed as delaying the dollar depreciation from 1971 to 1973. It
certainly seems reasonable to hypothesize that the shifts in the U.S. real
exchage rate are explained either by the U.S. real interest rate or by the
factors causing shifts in that rate.
One body of literature associates appreciation of the real exchange rate
with the temporary increase in the real interest rate which is induced by an
unexpected reduction in the growth rate of the nominal money supply.47 These
theories imply subsequent depreciations as the domestic real Interest rate
falls back to normal levels. Therefore they would seem to be of little value
as explanations of persistent shifts in the levels of both real interest rates
and real exchange rates.48
A more promising model can be based on the fact that the difference
between total national investment and saving is financed by and equal in23
amount to net capital inflows. On this view the 1971—1980 decline in U.S.
after—tax real interest rates reflects a downward shift in the perceived
desirability of investment in the United States relative to the rest of the
world in general. This would move desired U.S. net capital outflowsup
relative to 1960—1970 or the period since 1980. But net capital outflows
are equal in magnitude to the current account through the iron laws of double
entry bookkeeping. The only way to finance capital outflows is to increase
our exports and net foreign earnings relative to our imports.
The real return on InternatIonal investments is not affected by the level
of the exchange rate so long as that level Is expected to persist. However,
the current account is very much affected by the level of the real exchange
rate ——adepreciation increases the current account surplus as would be
required to finance increased net capital outflows. When America again became
an attrative place to invest, these net capital outflows dropped to become
large net capital inflows and the dollar appreciated to induce the correspond-
ing current account deficit. Indeed, since many foreign investors are de
facto tax exempt on U.S. interest, the tax—exempt real interest ratemay be
more appropriate to understanding international capital flows, and this tax—
exempt rate has been much higher in the 1980s as compared to the 1960g.
So we see that there is an explanation of the relationship among U.S.
real interest rates, the value of the U.S. dollar, capital flows, and the
current account that is consistent with the facts. Furthermore, this
explanation does not lead to predictions of an imminent collapse of the dollar
as suggested by comparisons of the dollar's purchasing power now with that in
1973—1980 while ignoring the period before 1973.
The 1984—1985 behavior of the real exchange rate is consistent with too
many explanations to provide much guidance as to the broader issues. These24
explanations include: (1) the entire episode was a rare speculative bubble,
perhaps pricked by inspired central bank intervention. (2) The real exchange
rate was at the right level in winter 1985, but subsequently depreciated due
to a major acceleration in U.S. money growth relative to the money growth of
America's major trading partners or due to the Administration's proposals to
shift the tax burden from Individuals to business. (3) The U.S. dollar was
more valuable in winter 1985 than under Bretton Woods because of the Darby
effect's raising tax—exempt real yields, particularly on long—term bonds; as
fears of future inflation abated the tax—exempt real yield dropped sharply in
1985 reducing the relative attractiveness of U.S. securities to foreign and
other tax—exempt investors.50 (4) U.S. trading partners have embarked on
less stimulative policies in 1985 In response to the dollar's appreciation
under their previous policies.
III.C. Internationalization of tanking and Finance and theLinkageof World
Capital Markets.
The move from fixed to floating exchange rates was expected to permit a
greater range of freedom for central banks to pursue independent monetary
policies with greater differences among real interest rates.5'
Future research may well demonstrate that the widely noted influence of
U.S. real interest rates on foreign rates in fact increased due to reductions
of capital controls and increased internationalizatIon of banking and finance
subsequent to the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system. For now, the
research is scanty but nonetheless suggestive.
Marston (1976), Cosandier and Lang (1981), and Fratianni and Wakeman
(1982) have shown that Eurocurrency markets are efficient in the sense of the
absence of arbitrage profits based on deviations from interest rate parity.
The integration of the Eurocurrency market does not necessarily Imply25
integration of even the national capital markets for which active Eurocurrency
trading exist. Dooley and Isard (1980) point to large differences between
domestic German rates and Euromark rates (up to 2 percent per annum in 1973)
and explain them by variations in political risks, particularly with respect
to capital control changes.
Hartman (1984) found evidence of two—way causality between domestic U.S.
interest rates and Eurodollar rates during 1975—1978 which suggested more
integrated capital markets under floating rates. However, Genberg, Saidi, and
Swoboda (1982) find little connection between American and foreign interest
rates movements: U.S. and U.K. rate movements did not seem to be influenced
by any foreign rate movements while Canadian and (for some periods) German
interest rates were influenced by the U.S. interest rate but only by a small
amount relative to Canadian and German events, respectively. Solnik (1982)
also reports that domestic factors dominate the determination of interest
rates in eight major developed countries over 1971—1980. Examining the
interest rate effects of U.S. money stock announcements, Husted and Kitchen
(1985) find that the bulk of the U.S. interest—rate change is reflected in the
Canadian interest rate but for Germany nearly all of the effect is on the
forward premium which seems consistent with much weaker links between the U.S.
and Germany than between the U.S. and Canada. These studies are primarily
concerned with nominal interest rates so the results may primarily reflect the
relative importance of movements in domestic and common international deter-
minants of expected inflation during the periods considered.
Ptfewstudies have attempted to examine the extent to which real interest
rates are equalized internationally. Cumby and Obstfeld (1984) and Mishkin
(1984) report strong evidence that tax—exempt real rates were not equalized
across countries during 1976—1981 or 1967—1979, respectively. Using data for26
1973—1982, Mark (1985) demonstrates that neither are after—tax real rates
equalized.52 While real rates may not be equalized internationally, capital
flows induced by real rate differentials can imply cross—country linkages.
Cumby and Mishkin (1986) show that real rate movements among the U.S. and
seven other Industrialized countries are significantly linked even though the
linkages are significantly less than complete. That is, an increase in the
U.S. real rate would tend to increase real rates abroad by a lesser amount as
capital Is drawn to the United States. Edwards and Khan (1985) propose an
empirical measure of the extent to which domestic interest rates are linked to
foreign rates.
The incomplete linkage of real interest rates internationally appears to
reflect risk premia which vary with the size of a nation's foreign borrowing.
It is not clear whether this reflects primarily changing prices of systematic
risk as the world portfolio is changed or varying perceptions of political
risk which acts like a default risk.53 Obstfeld (1985) reports evidence which
is consistent with increasingly integrated capital markets in recent years,
but corroborating evidence on this issue is sadly lacking.
IV.Conclusions
Thispaper has examined three intertwined questions: the international-
ization of American banking and finance, cross—country risk associated with
general increases in real interest rates, and the forces shaping the U.S. real
interest rate and its influence on the foreign real interest rates. The
Internationalization of private banking and finance has substantially substi-
tuted for governmental linkages of capital markets which existed under the
Bretton Woods system. Indeed, the process of internationalization has been
fostered by the reduced need for capital controls with central banks largely
out of the exchange rate intervention business.5427
The return of the U.S. domestic after—tax real inerest rates to normal
or slightly higher levels since 1981 has raised real interest rates throughout
the world. This has greatly increased the real debt service of a number of
countries with disastrous, nondiversifiable consequences for international
banks. While the adjustment period is more stressful than the final
equilibrium when (reduced) capital inflows resume, the only hope for suffering
countries of a substantial fall in after—tax U.S. real interest rates would be
that the Federal Reserve System's recent policies reignite inflation and
return the U.S. to a situation more like the 1970s. Tax—exempt real rates,
however, maybemore relevant internationally, and they have declined recently
as expected inflation has waned.
A more positive viewpoint is that the low real interest rates and value
of the U.S. dollar in the 1970s reflected profound problems in the United
States. Over the longer run, a healthy America is vital to the health of the
world and a return to higher real interest rates iniqhtbea price &orth raving.28
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paper, especially Lawrence Goldberg, John Haltiwanger, Brian Horrigan, James
Houpt, James Lothian, Carter Murphy and Mark Plant. This paper was presented
at the second International Symposium on Financial Development sponsored by
the Korea Federation of Banks, Seoul, December 1985.
'See Lees (1982, pp. 196—7) for a discussion of this longer term
perspective. Although the trade—financing aspect of international banking
became increasingly important after 1945, the main expansion of international
banking ocurred subsequent to 1960. Theobald (1981) argues that the branches
Citibank had established primarily to finance trade with Europe put it in a
position to enjoy a major share of the Eurodollar market when it developed in
the 1960's.
2Schwartz (1983, pp. 18—19) succinctly summarizes conditions under the
European Payments Union which was dissolved December 24, 1958, and replaced by
general convertibility of European currencies into U.S. dollars at least for
current account purposes. She notes that "[i]t was not until 1961, however,
that restrictions against U.S. exports were removed."
3See Sachs (1984) for a review and extension of the literature on the
advantages of bank lending over securities sales.
4See Wilson (1985) for one example.
5Dally volume of Federal Funds lending averaged less than $2 billion in
1960 (Willis, 1964, p. 29). Currently, Federal Funds and such cousins as
interbank repurchase agreements average well over $100 billion per day. Local
banking markets still exist today: Keeley and Zimmerman (1985) report recent
spreads of 2 percent or more in the state mean interest rates paid on large39
consumer checking and savings accounts (Super NOW and MMDA, respectively)over
seven states in the twelfth Federal Reserve District.
6Correspondent relationships and representative offices alsoshould be
mentioned. The former arrangements are used where the volume of business is
insufficient to justify a direct presence. Representative offices arean
intermediate step prior to establishment of a foreign branch or subsidiaryor
an alternative to such a branch or subsidiary where foreign banks are denied
entry into the market for banking services.
7See Goldberg and Saunders (1980), Lees (1982,p. 19,8), Theobald (1981),
and U.S. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1974,pp. 105—106).
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'3See Terrell and Key (1977, p. 56).
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due to 4 banks controlled since 1974—1975. Three then pending acquisitions
(subsequently approved) would have added another $20.6 billion in total
assets.
'5A foreign observer should note that data on the number of U.S. banks is
inflated by a factor of perhaps 6 or 7 due to various state regulations
restricting branching. As a result, many separate banks may be owned by the
same holding company rather than having a single bank with many branches.
16Goldberg and Saunders also found the t*tI$ exchange rate to be a
statistically significant factor over 1972—1979. When an exchange—rate index
was substituted, this finding disappeared.1 believe that the relationship
for the DM/$ exchange rate reflects coincidental trends in this rate and
growth in foreign banks in the U.S. over this period. Accordingly, little
weight should be put on that theoretically surprising finding.
'7See Ball and Tschoegl (1982) and Walker (1983).
18The F.D.I.C. has effectively guaranteed all deposits inlarge banks
(regardless of the $100,000 legal limit) since the Continental—Illinois
affair; critics view this as subsidizing various risky practices including
American banks' borrowing and lending abroad. A related policy concern is41
thatoverseas deposits of U.S. banks are exempt from deposit insurance
premiums even though the F.D.I.C. effectively Insures them; Federal Reserve
Board Chairman Paul A. Voicker proposed to Congress imposing such premiums on
September 11, 1985 (see Langley and Wynter 1985).
191n efficient markets, a rise or fall in interest rates may be
anticipated and reflected in the term structure of Interest rates and futures
market prices. Accordingly, the statements should be interpreted as a rise or
fall relative to previously anticipated levels of interest rates. In the
United States, interest rate risk in this simple form is primarily a problem
for thrift institutions rather than banks.
20That is, the modern theory of finance says that in an efficient
financial market, the price of $100 tomorrow for sure will be exactly the same
as the price of $200 tomorrow which is payable only if a fair coin turns out
to be heads.
210f course, some Texas banks, for example, still have disproportionate
loans to oil—price sensitive firms with recent disastrous results.
22Chen, Roll, and Ross (1985) have empirically tested the APM with data
drawn from U.S. securities markets. They found no evidence of priced risk
associated with either the dollar exchange rate or the price of oil. These
factors are nonetheless included in the list as being potentially more
important for foreign than for American securities. Chen, Roll, and Ross
identified another set of five factors as affecting expected returns in their
data set: innovations in Industrial production, in the BAA—AAA bond yield
spread, in the long— versus short—term governments yield, and in inflation, as
well as their measure of the change in the expected inflation rate which can
also be interpreted as the ex—post real interest rate. The first three
factors I am lumping together as the business cycle, and the last two factors42
are represented by my items 2 and 3.
23See Darby, Lothian, et al. (1983).
24The problems in foreign loans associated with the higher real interest
rates of the 1980s are well known. Schoder and Vankudre (1984) found that the
Mexican debt crisis of 1982 depressed returns to bank stocks generally because
country—by—country loan—exposure disclosures was not required until 1983.
However, Cornell and Shapiro (1984) find that adverse effects on bank stock
returns in both 1982 and 1983 were related to the degree of exposure to Latin
American events. The difference between the two studies seems to be that the
latter allowed for gradual leakage of information ——aboutboth events and
bank portfolios ——whereasthe former study concentrated on a few public
announcement dates.
Porzekanski (1981, p. 10), in contrast, reminds us that foreign loan
losses were extremely low in the 1970s when real interest rates were very low.
(The causes of movements in real interest rates are discussed in Section III
below.) Ozler (1985) reports that reschedulings prior to 1981 were beneficial
to the lending banks because of the resulting fees and increases in spread
over LIBOR, but this was reversed after 1980 when sharp increases in real
interest rates increased the credibility of LDC threats to repudiate.
25The formula for maintaining constant real (dollar—denominated) interest
payments as a fraction of income is
b=y—r— r—e
where b is gross real borrowing minus real interest payments as a fraction
of debt (all in constant U.S. dollars), r is the U.S. real interest rate,
and y, r, e are the growth rates of real income,r, and the real exchange
rate, respectively. This formula holds exactly only for continuously
compounded growth rates (logarithmic changes). In steady—state equilibrium,43
r and e are both 0 and there will be a net inflow of resources (b > 0)
so long as y > r. Note that the transitional effects of a movement in r
can be huge. For example, suppose a country was growing at 8% and paying a
real interest rate of 2%; in initial equilibrium it could finance an amount of
investment equal to 6% of its outstanding debt each year without ever increas—
ing its debt burden relative to GNP. ow suppose that the real interest rate
rises to 4%. To maintain literally a constant interest burden, the country
would have to repay a literally incredible 47 1/2% of its foreign debt. More
likely results would be allowIng the Interest burden to rise, rescheduling, or
repudiation. Note, however, that even if the country lets the target interest
burden double with the real interest rate, (so that debt/GNP is constant) the
net inflow of resources falls by a third from 6% to 4% of the foreign debt.
Edwards (1984) finds that the real interest rate paid by LDCs in fact
increases with debt/GNP, but given his period of measurement this could be a
proxy for real interest payments divided by GNP. If r rises with the latter
variable, the constant debt/GNP policy might be infeasible.
26Grossman and Van Huyck (1985)argue that reschedulings associated with
identifiably bad states of the world are "excusable" and so do not cost the
government much reputation in the world capital markets. This may provide an
alternative or complementary explanation for Ozier's (1985) empirical result
that countries which rescheduled before 1981 typically improved the returns to
their lenders while the lenders were made worse off in the post—1980 era (of
excusable defaults due to high real interest rates and the high U.S. dollar?).
27Classic references are to Karaken and Wallace (1978), Edwards and Scott
(1979), and Dotham and Williams (1980). This analysis assumes that bankers
are maximizing stockholder's expected value and are not concerned about loss
of their (nondiversified) firm—specific human capital.44
28Barth et al. (1985) have demonstrated the importance of this in the
risk—taking of U.S. thrift institutions with negligible or negative market—
equity values.
29Horvitz (1980) relates bank examination not so much to preventing bank
failure but limiting the size of losses to the F.D.I.C. by early detection.
Other than for poor control over operating expenses, this makes sense only in
preventing the management from taking undue risks: if the market—equity value
is negative nothing is gained for the F.D.I.C. if the bank Is closed before
this is reflected on the accounting books of the bank.
30lndeed, bankers might note that government officials in the 1970s
encouraged this as a private substitute for foreign aid. Bank examiners have
been Increasingly concerned with country risk since 1977. A partially opera-
tive standard supervision policy was strengthened and made universal under the
International Lending Supervision Act passed in late 1983. The correlation of
country risk across countries does not seem to be much recognized by
examiners, however, since "[blanks with large concentrations of loans In
particular countries are expected to maintain higher capital ratios than well—
diversified banks." (Young, 1985, p. 37). In future research, 1 plan to
examine LDC bond returns for evidence on these Issues; Edwards (1985) finds
that bond returns provide useful data on perceived risk for these countries.
311f output did not rise, the fall in private investment would
approximately equal the increase in government spending. If output is
increased —asappears to be the case in the short run —investmentfalls
less or even rises.
32See, for example, Plosser (1982) and Evans (l985a,b).
33Further adjustment of this consolidated structural deficit for the
inflationary component of state and local interest and cyclical reduction in45
the state and local surplus could easily change this small remaining deficit
to a small surplus. Furthermore, Eisner and Pieper (1985) observe that
government spending for net capital formation generally substantially exceeds
S200 billion; on their balance—sheet view this factor alone turns the entire
federal deficit into a surplus.
34The correction in Table 4 represents the product of a 3.8percent
inflation rate for 1985 and a $1300 billion average private—investor holdings
of federal debt. These numbers are approximate and it is the order of magni-
tude rather than a precise estimate whIch 1s Intended. Further dIscussion of
the inflation adjustment can be found in Siegel (1979), Jump (1980), Cagan
(1981), Horrlgan and Protopapadakis (1982), and Darby and Lothian (1983).
35Darby, Haltiwanger, and Plant (1985) indicate a normal unemployment
rate a bit under 6 percent for 1985. The average unemployment rate for the
year is estimated at 7.2 percent. The rule of thumb among budget analysts is
that a $40 billion increase in the federal budget deficit with each 1 percent-
age point Increase in the unemployment rate. ($40 billion /%) x(7.2% —6.0%)
=$48billion. There are numerous other ways to estimate the cyclical compon-
ent of the deficit and a number of $10 to $20 billion higher could be
justified. Again the aim here is to provide a conservative guide to the order
of magnitude which is involved.
36Using a related approach Barro (1984, 1985) found that the 1982—84
federal deficits were in line with U.S. experience since 1920 given the
unemployment rate, inflation rate, and unusually high real interest rates.
37The alert reader might note that perhaps Reagan's shift to defense
spending from other goods and services and welfare payments has increased
government spending and so increased real interest rates in that way.
Although federal spending for goods and services edged up from 7.49% of GNP in46
1980to 8.07% in 1984, offsetting movements in state and local spending were
such that total government spending fell ever so slightly from 20.44% to
20.43% of GNP over the same years.
38References to the ultrarationality literature include Barro (1974,
1978), Kochin (1974), David and Scadding (1974), Darby (1979), Seater (1982),
Korinendi (1983), Seater and Mariano (1985).
39Figure 1 is an updated version of a figure appearing in Holland (1984).
Two changes from Holland are (1) the use of the term "tax—exempt rate" for
his (I believe misleading) term "before—tax rate" and (2)the use of market
estimates of the marginal tax rate.
400n1y two quarters per year were plotted due to availability of (the
Livingston) data on inflation expectations. Similar movements in real rates
were observed for 6—month Treasury bills and 10—year government bonds.
41me marginal tax rate is estimated as 1 minus the ratio of AAA
municipal bond yields to AAA corporate bond yields (quarterly average of
monthly Citibase data; see Ayanian 1983). A somewhat higher tax rate would be
estimated if continuous 1—year bill data were available and used.
42See Darby (1975) and especially End of Chapter Essay 4 in Darby and
Melvin (1986).
43The marginal tax rate implicit in the bond market was used here to
obtain a continuous series. Implicit tax rates in the bill market are
believed to be higher than in the bond market because of the dominance of
corporate tax payers in the bill market. An underestimate of the tax—rate
overestimates the after—tax rate by an amount which increases with the level
of nominal interest rates. Holland (1984) examines monetary policy, the state
of the economy, business taxes, federal budget deficits, and declining
relative price of energy as possible explanations of the upward shift in real47
rates, but finds them all lacking —generallybecause they change too late to
explain the shift which occurred in late 1980 and early 1981.
44See Beranek, Humphrey, and Timberlake (1985).
455ee Krasker (1980).
may be premature, of course, to term the 1984—1985 experience a
bubble. An alternative characterization of the post—1980 experience is that
the dollar appreciated from summer 1980 to winter 1985 except for a two—year
pause in 1982—1984 and then reversed trend in 1985. As will be noted below,
the experience sInce February 1985 is not yet sufficIent to be informatIve as
to the value of alternative explanations.
47Classic references are to Dornbusch (1976) and Frankel (1979).
48Meese and Rogoff (1983a, 1983b) have confirmed the weakempirical value
of these theories as an explanation for recent movements in the real exchange
rate.
49Obviously, when we are concerned with movements in the real value of
the dollar generally, the timing is dominated by the U.S. events which would
affect all bilateral exchange rates. If we were particularly concerned with
the British pound or French franc, for example, our discussion would obviously
require adjustment for the events surrounding the elections of Thatcher and
Mitterand, respectively.
50As U.S. real interest rates dropped in 1985, so didprojections of
future deficits. So even the deficit story is roughly consistent with the
1985 depreciation.
51flarby (1985), summarizing research in Darby, Lothian, et al. (1983) and
elsewhere, argues that central banks in fact exercised a substantial amount of
independence in monetary policy under the Bretton Woods system of adjustable
(not fixed) exchange rates and capital and trade controls.48
52Therole of taxes in determining interest rates in a world with
differential taxes and capital flows is a complicated question. Lee and
Zechner (1984) make an important pioneering contribution to our understanding
of the issues involved.
53The analysis in Darby, Lothian, et al. (1983) emphasized systematic
risks. Subsequent events and reflection on the "peso problem" (see Krasker
1980) has led me to consider movements in measured risk premiums (differences
between real rates) as perhaps dominated by movements in a generally small
probability of constructive default in the form of capital controls or other
sovereign acts.
54Loopesko (1984) provides evidence that central banks have indeed
continued to intervene under floating exchange rates, that this intervention
did affect exchange rates in the short run, but that the size of the effect
was small relative to the magnitude ofintervention. Results like these ——
andthe leading role of the U.S. Treasury ——mayhave reduced the level of
intervention in recent years until the announcement on September 22, 1985, of
a program of joint intervention by American, Britain, France, Germany, and
Japan.49
Table1
Indicators of Foreign Involvement of U.S.Banks
Year
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1984
1. Number of U.S. Banks
Operating Foreign Branches 8 13 79 126 159 163
2. Number of Foreign Branches
of U.S. Banks 124 211 532 762 799 905
3. Total Assets of Foreign
Branches of U.S. Banks
($ Billions) n.a. 8.9 46.5176.5397.5452.2
4. Total Assets of All
U.S.Banks ($ Billions) 257.6377.3576.2965.2 3.703.7 2262.6
5. Ratio of Row 3 to Row 4n.a. 2.4% 8.1%18.3%23.3%20.0%
6. Claims of U.S. Banks
on Foreigners C$ Billions) 4.5 9.8 11.8 54.7176.9409.5
7. Claims of U.S. Banks on
Foreign Banks ($ Billions) 1.4 3.1 5.1 33.8119.6291.2
8. Claims of U.S. Banks on
Foreign Nonbanks
(5 Billions) 3.1 6.7 6.7 20.9 57.3118.3
9. Claims of Foreigners on
U.S. Banks ($ Billions) 9.7 17.3 31.3 62.7151.4338.5
Note: Data are not strictly comparable over time.
Sources: Rows 1—3, 1960—1975, Fieleke (1977, p.10),
Rows 1—2, 1980, 67th Annual Report of the Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System, 1980.
Rows 1—2, 1984, 71st Annual Report of the Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System, 1984.50
(Table 1 concluded)
Row 3, 1980, Federal Reserve Bulletin, September 1981, p. A56.
Row 3, 1984, Federal Reserve Bulletin, September 1985, p. A55.
Row 4, 1960—1970, Banking and Monetary Statistics, 1941—1970,
pp. 29—31.
Row 4, 1975, Federal Reserve Bulletin, June 1976, p. Al6.
Row 4, 1980, Federal Reserve Bulletin, June 1981, p. Al7.
Row 4, 1984, Federal Reserve Bulletin, September 1985, p. A18.
Rows 6—9, 1960—1984, International Financial Statistics (March
1985 tape and Nay 1985 issue) of the I.M.F., lines 7a.d,
7a.d minus 7add, 7add, and Th.d, respectively.51
Table2
Total Assests of Foreign Banks and Subsidiaries in the U.S.
(Amounts in $Billions)
Branches & Subsidiary Total Assets
Agenclesa Commercial Banks Amount% of U.S. Total
1966 n.a. n.a. 6.5 1.6%
1972 22.2 4.6 26.8 3.6%
1975 50.9 13.4 64.3 6.7%
1978 106.3 23.2 129.5 10.2%
1980 147.9 50.2 198.1 11.6%
1984 272.8 105.6 378.3 16.7%
Notes: Data are not strictly comparable over time.
aBranches and agencies include New York Investment Companies, Banking
Edge Act Corporations, and Agreement Corporations.
Sources: 1966: "Proposed Legislation Re Foreign Banks, "Federal Reserve
Bulletin, December 1974, 60: 881.
1972—1978: Computer printouts supplied in 1980 to Lawrence C.
Goldberg by the International Banking Section, Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System (see Goldberg and Saunders, 1981).
1980—1984: Computer printouts supplied in 1985 to the author by the
Financial Structure Section, Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System.Table 3
Number of Foreign Controlled U.S. Banking Offices
Data
Branches & Subsidiary As Percent of
Year nc1esa U.S. Banks Total All U.S. Banksb
1972 87 26 113 0.8
1975 153 33 186 1.3
1978 276 40 316 2.1
1980 345 44 389 2.6
1984 530 66 596 3.9
Notes: Data are not strictly comparable over time.
aBranches and agencies include New York Iniestment Companies, Banking
Edge Act Corporations, and Agreement Corporations.
bDenominator is number of U.S. chartered commercial banks plus foreign
branches and agencies.
Sources: Computer printouts supplied in 1985 to the author by the Financial
Structure Section, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.53
Table 4
Adjustment of U.S. Federal Deficit, 1985
(Amounts in $Billions)
Estimated federal deficit (IPA basis) 197
Less, Inflation component of federal interest payments 49
Inflation—adjusted federal deficit 148
Less, Cyclical component of federal deficit 48
Inflation—adjusted structural federal deficit 100
Less, State and local surplus (NIPA basis) 58
Adjusted government deficit 42
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce and computations by the author as
described in text.54
Table5
Interest Concepts in Figure
Nominal rate =imarket yield on one—year Treasury bill





Expected inflation over year =p
Marginal tax rate =t
Note: i—r=p
* * r t r —r=ti=t-i——-+---— p
*t*'t
i=r +-1—-r
Sources: i adjusted to yield basis from discount rate data from Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis and Citibase.
p estimated inflation rate using Livingston data and John Carison's
formula from Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
t estimated as 1 — orp) where and i orare data
on AAA rated municipa an corporate bonds, respectvey, from
Citibase.55
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